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Introduction: Encountering Otherness
When I was young, I heard a small girl whispering: “Mum, Look at her!  She 
looks weird!” and her mother saying “Don’t look at her, my dear.  If you are not 
behaving well, you will be like her!”  The look was sharp, and I felt vulnerable.  I 
started asking myself: “Is there something wrong with me?”2)  My otherness is 
an able-bodied construction that is a consequence of the whisper of the mother 
and daughter.  My body was the Other.  The disabled Other is a key concept in 
this essay; it opposes the able-bodied Same.  My otherness refers to that which is 
other than the initial concept being investigated.  The Other of the able-bodied 
often signifies me as ‘Other than myself ’; hence, the disabled Other is acknowl-
edged as not-able-bodied (the Same); thus the letter ‘O’ is capitalised.  For Mau-
rice Merleau-Ponty (1998 [1945]), the body is not merely an object in space, 
rather the body inhabits space and through it one experiences the world and the 
Other.
In his book titled e Body Silent: e Dierent World of the Disabled, Rob-
ert Murphy (2001 [1987]) offers a personal account of his experience of becom-
ing disabled as the result of a spinal tumor, as well as an ethnographic account of 
the world of a person with physical disability.  As a Professor of anthropology at 
Columbia University, Murphy uses his skills at participant observation improved 
in the Amazon rainforest and describes his impact of physical disability on his 
status as a member of society.  He states:
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Not only are their bodies altered, but their ways of thinking about them-
selves and about the persons and objects of the external world have be-
come profoundly transformed. They have experienced a revolution of 
consciousness. They have undergone a metamorphosis. (Murphy, 2001 
[1987]: 87) 
Like Franz Kafka’s novel, Metamorphosis (2012 [1915]),3) Murphy’s discussion of 
becoming disabled in regard to encountering otherness and the body itself de-
scribes in writing the experience of physical disability and the experience of the 
body-in-the-able-bodied-world.  He demonstrates the ways in which disability 
deconstructs not only the experience of the body-in-the-able-bodied-world but 
also the experience of being represented.  Unlike Murphy, I have never expe-
rienced the able-bodied embodiment and any metamorphosis from the able-
bodied to the disabled.  However, like Murphy, my disabled body unfolds the 
relational difference of lived experiences; the difference may be considered as 
the dimension of the flux which opens myself to otherness and sameness by a 
circular interplay of consciousness and unconsciousness.
Once I entered the able-bodied world and felt the weight of the able-bodied 
gaze, I experienced my otherness and became aware of pre-theoretical attitudes 
which, up to that point, had not existed for me.  I recount my experience on a 
train of being fixed by an able-bodied other — an other who happened to be a 
child who had already been habituated to see the disabled as defined by the able-
bodied imagination.  As the young girl’s refrain, “Look at her!, She looks weird!” 
came to a close with a fearful questioning of the ‘disabled’ next move, I not only 
experienced the gaze of the able-bodied, I also began to see myself through the 
able-bodied gaze.  I have difficulties simply to form a coherent body schema, 
which a subjective concept of my bodily form based upon self-observation and 
the reactions of others.  In this essay, I shall argue that a phenomenology of 
physical disability (the experience of my own embodiment and of being the 
disabled Other) can only be understood in the encounter with the able-bodied 
Same — the norm.
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Phenomenology of Otherness
Merleau-Ponty’s body schema highlights some difficulties that I experience in 
the able-bodied world.  The body schema is an organising formation contained 
in my body that provides me with a whole understanding of my body, which is 
experienced as a unified whole or ‘Gestalt’ (Weiss, 1999: 10-2).  In his account, 
the mutual relation between the body and the world gives rise to the possibility 
of a reciprocal constructing and transforming of both.  The body schema more-
over provides me with a pre-reflective, instantaneous knowledge of the position 
of my body parts.  For example, when I see a straphanger in a train, I may un-
thinkingly hold onto it with my hand.  Guided by my body schema that knows 
that my hand can hold things, my hand automatically restricts and is guided to 
the strap.  The body is not a mere object in space, but rather it is one’s way of 
being in the lived world.  Merleau-Ponty (1998 [1945]) does not consider physi-
cal disability at any great length.  His concept of the body suggests undeveloped 
possibilities for articulating physical disability beyond the able-bodied/disabled 
dualism.  For him, the body gives rise to some particular forms through a pro-
cess of mutual divergence and encroachment.  However, I do not have any mu-
tual relationship between my disabled body and the able-bodied world.
What is given in experience, the lived world as experienced, is the world 
that one finds after one has linked one’s assumptions.  One is always already 
living in the world, and it provides the ground for one understanding one’s self 
within the world.  A description can transform the way we see the world, or the 
way in which we are in a given condition.  It is an image of the world, and as 
such, it can change perceptions of the world.  The impact of description is also 
seen in such thinkers as Simone de Beauvoir (2011 [1949]) and Frantz Fanon 
(2008 [1952])4) who thought of otherness within the self.  They wrote about what 
was given in their embodied experiences, and in doing so transformed the way 
their readers think and act concerning the readers whose experience encompass 
theirs.  In this essay, the description I shall put forward will not offer a radical 
transformation from Fanon and Beauvoir, but it shall develop them to help my 
readers understand my own lived experience.
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Thinking of the Other
In the Second Sex, Beauvoir (2011 [1949]) describes how men are regarded as 
the norm and women as the Other.  She states: 
Man thinks himself without woman.  Woman does not think herself 
without man.  And she is nothing other than what man decides; she is 
thus called “the sex,” meaning that the male sees her essentially as a sexed 
being; for him she is sex, so she is it in the absolute. She is determined 
and differentiated in relation to man, while he is not in relation to her; 
she is the inessential in front of the essential. He is the Subject; he is the 
Absolute, she is the Other. (Beauvoir, 2011 [1949]: 6)
Thus, in Beauvoir, women are described as lacking, or a deviation from the norm. 
From this quote, we understand that there is an inequality between man and 
woman.  The definition of woman is given in terms of this inequality.  Man is the 
absolute human form.  Woman is known only as she relates to what is taken to be 
the absolute.  Thus, woman is defined by her absence of male qualities.  Beauvoir 
(2011 [1949]: 6) writes: “The category of Other is as original as consciousness 
itself.  The duality between Self and Other can be found in the most primitive so-
cieties...”  Establishing otherness, for her, is automatic. Applying Sartre’s thoughts 
on the existence of the Other to her definition of woman, Beauvoir (2011[1949]: 
6-9) rejects the idea of human society as a ‘Mitsein’ (being-with) and understands 
in consciousness what Hegel (1977 [1807]) acknowledged as a fundamental hos-
tility.  “The subject posits itself only in opposition; it asserts itself as the essential 
and sets up the other as inessential as the object” (Beauvoir, 2011 [1949]: 7).  Here, 
Beauvoir enables us to understand how otherness is formed. However, in Fanon, 
the application of Beauvoir’s Otherness to his black identity is problematic.
In a chapter in Black Skin, White Masks called “The lived experience of the 
Black man”, Fanon (2008 [1952]) condemns Sartre in a footnote: 
Though Sartre’s speculations on the existence of  “The Other” remain cor-
rect (insofar as, we may recall remember, Being and Nothingness describes 
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an alienated consciousness), their application to a black consciousness 
proves fallacious because the white man is not only “the Other,” but also 
the master, whether real or imaginary. (Fanon, 2008 [1952]:117)
I can explain Fanon’s question: How can he, as a black man, be free from the 
white man’s world if his hostility towards the white man is never that of the 
dominant over the Other.  In short, why is it significant that the white man is the 
dominant as well as the Other?  How does the black man’s dilemma compare to 
that of a woman as described by Beauvoir?
For Beauvoir, the world is controlled by a white patriarchy, and any defini-
tion of women must be in terms of, or a response to, the definition of what man 
is.  Women must be the negative, because men are both the positive and the nor-
mative neutral.   But her claim makes sense only for white women; black men 
cannot be placed on the negative scale along with white women.  Black men 
will certainly not fit there, for they are not a negation of white men.  They are 
certainly neither positive nor neutral.  For black men, the world is dominated by 
white patriarchy.  However, white women are already in the negative slot.  What 
is the black man’s place in this hierarchy?  Just how inferior is he?  Fanon asks 
the question and offers an answer:
A feeling of inferiority?  No, a feeling of not existing.  Sin is black as vir-
tue is white.  All those white men, fingering their guns, can’t be wrong.  I 
am guilty.  I do not know what of, but I know I’m a wretch. (Fanon, 2008 
[1952]: 118)
Here, Fanon feels that he is rejected in white society.  He suggests that colonised 
people (Fanon himself) are made to feel inferior and alienated from their own 
culture because the history, culture, language, customs and beliefs of the colo-
nisers are promoted as universal, normative and superior.  Paradoxically, this 
leads to colonised people adopting these cultures and beliefs in an attempt to 
make themselves feel less inferior.
Like W. E. B. Du Bois’ (2000 [1903]) earlier analysis of black men’s double 
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consciousness and the effect of internalised dehumanisation, Fanon analyses the 
impact of a cultural inferiority complex on colonised individuals.5)  He explains 
the relationship between the coloniser and himself, and aspects of psychosocial 
disavowal, self-loathing, rejection of homeland culture, and the adaptation of 
the coloniser’s culture, which both reflected his lived experience as a student 
and a professional soldier in Martinique and France.  He argues that in order 
to function normally in a racist society, he, as a black man, essentially puts on a 
white mask and mentally alienates himself from his dark skin.  I have come to 
realise that double consciousness creates an element of conflict within me as I 
struggle (often unsuccessfully) to reconcile my identity as a person with physical 
disability and as a Japanese woman (often able-bodied).
The Disabled Body as the Other
The Other is constructed from images, discourses, and representations of what 
the privileged and dominant group does not want to become or cannot attain. 
The Other is then projected onto groups of people.  The process of ‘othering’, 
however, undermines the subjectivity of such people.  The Other is seen as an 
object, a restricted subjectivity.  I suggest that people with disability are formed 
as the Other of the able-bodied norm.  Otherness is projected onto the disabled 
subject in the interests of the able-bodied such that he/she is constructed as less 
or abnormal. The disabled is all that the able-bodied is anxious to avoid, and all 
that the able-bodied may nevertheless become.  As the Other, the disabled exists 
as he/she is perceived by the able-bodied, and the disabled person has no role 
in fixing the content or context of his/her categorisation.  This leads to a split 
within the consciousness of those who are labelled ‘disabled’.  The disabled con-
tinually beholds his/herself; he/she is always accompanied by his/her own image 
of him/herself.  From earliest childhood, he/she has been influenced and forced 
to assess him/herself repeatedly from the point of view of the able-bodied.  Thus, 
the disabled becomes both the spectator and the spectacle within him/herself. 
The able-bodied looks at the disabled, and the disabled watches him/herself be-
ing looked at.  
The concept of the able-bodied gaze has some similarities to Fanon’s (2008 
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[1952]) concept of the white gaze.  Confronted with the white gaze, Fanon can-
not escape from the process of racial othering, as a result of the process, he liter-
ally becomes his skin, “overdetermined from the outside” (Fanon, 2008 [1952]). 
Similarly, Beauvoir (2011 [1949]) focuses on the impact of the male gaze.  She 
argues that men have the active viewing position while women have the pas-
sive viewing position.  Beauvoir sees that women, as objects of this male gaze, 
view themselves from a male perspective.  Both Fanon and Beauvoir consider 
the viewer as a white man, and it forces women and black men to internalise the 
normative (white and male) gaze and to see themselves as the Other.
As I mentioned before, Murphy (2001 [1987]) describes the physical nego-
tiation of his quadriplegia, and of fixed assumptions towards those who are the 
disabled Other.  His work is also a personal narrative of his changing relation-
ship with his wife, on whom he is gradually more dependent; of his relationships 
with colleagues, friends, and students; of his increasing isolation from his own 
body and the able-bodied world; of finding some purpose in his transformed 
condition.  He states:
As Simone de Beauvoir wrote, anatomy may not be destiny, but it is in-
deed an unstated first assumption in all of our enterprises.  Each person 
simply accepts the fact that he has two legs and can walk; he does not 
think about it or marvel at it any more than he would feel gratitude for 
the oxygen content of air. (Murphy, 2001 [1987]: 12)
Thus, he applies the metaphor of an ethnographic field trip to his own experi-
ence. Drawing not only on his own experience but also on research for which 
he received funding, Murphy instructs his audience in the metaphysics of his 
condition, and in the social as well as bodily challenges of disability.
In the able-bodied gaze, people with disability refer to that which is under-
stood as the binary opposite to the able-bodied.  Like women and black men, 
people with disability are forced to internalise the normative gaze in order to see 
themselves as the Other.  However, the able-bodied gaze has some differences 
from the male gaze.  The female body is identified as an object for sexual desire 
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and the black body is seen as an object of observation and control, while the 
disabled body as an object of vulnerability and revulsion. In the case of the girl’s 
gaze at me: “the stare sculpts the disabled subject into a grotesque spectacle. The 
stare is the gaze intensified, framing her body as an icon of deviance” (Garland 
Thompson 1997: 26).  However, I argue that we often regard able-bodied people 
as active, supervising subjects, and treat people with disability as passive, patho-
logical, and vulnerable objects of anxiety for able-bodied people.
The Internalised Gaze: towards a Phenomenological Dialogue 
between the Self and the Other
The able-bodied gaze is also internalised within myself.  I am looked upon with 
the able-bodied gaze, but I also look at myself through the able-bodied gaze. 
When I look at the reflection of my body in a mirror, I often feel like screaming 
at myself.  I am always a spectacle, and ask myself ‘What is wrong with me?”  I 
continually stare at myself.  I am continually accompanied by my own image. 
It is similar to Jacques Lacan’s (1997 [1949]) concept of the mirror stage.  For 
Lacan, the mirror stage forms the sense of self (ego) as dependent upon external 
objects, on others.  I entered into social relations through language (the young 
girl’s words: “Mum, Look at her!  She looks weird!”) and the gaze.  The Other has 
been elaborated within social and linguistic frameworks that provide my subjec-
tivity.  Lacan (1997 [1949]) suggests that we (infants) pass through a stage in 
which an external image of the body (reflected in a mirror, or represented to the 
subject (infant) through the primary caregiver or others) constructs a psychic 
reaction that gives rise to the mental representation of the Self.  Thus, I identi-
fied with the image, which served as a gestalt of the perception of myself, but 
since the image of my disabled body did not correspond with my own vulner-
ability, the image was constructed as an able bodied form toward which I have 
continuously struggled throughout my life.
The feature of Lacan’s thought which concerns me here is the significance 
he affords both the gaze and the return of the gaze in a process of recognising 
the desire of the Other.  I consider that Lacan develops a psychological theory 
of child development with Hegelian dialectic to establish his own models of the 
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mirror stage and of the dialectic of gaze and desire.  Lacan then describes the 
function of the ‘I’, the impact it releases in any relation to the Other.  The gaze 
is played by the desire of the Other in creating that desire which belongs to the 
subject, symbolsed as an ‘I’; the struggle in a process of becoming ‘I’ is released 
by the conflict between the self and the Other.  Here, Lacan (1997 [1949]: 5) is 
interested not only in the development of the ‘I’ of the mirror stage, established 
on an illusory self-recognition (misrecognition), but also in the development of 
what he calls the “social I”, whose own desires reflect the desires of others and, in 
so doing, put the subject into relationships with those others.
Beauvoir (2011 [1949]) also takes up the Lacanian idea of the gaze and ap-
plies it to the male gaze at woman.  She argues that the concept of ‘woman’ is a 
male concept: woman is always the Other since the male is the voyeur.  While 
man is the subject, woman is the object: the meaning of what it is to be a woman 
is constructed by men.  Beauvoir argues that it is not the biological condition of 
women per se that constitutes a handicap: it is how a woman understands this 
condition which reduces it into the binary oppositions.  Female experiences, for 
example, the development of the female body, menstruation, pregnancy, child-
birth and menopause, have no meaning in themselves.  In the case of thinking 
about female experiences, women cannot see their bodies through their own 
gaze, since they internalise the male gaze.
Fanon (2008 [1952]), like Lacan and Beauvoir, considers the impact of the 
gaze to the function of ‘I’, and explains why the gaze is upsetting.  This is because 
to perceive is to look at, and to understand a look is not to understand a look 
as an object in the world; it is to be conscious of being looked at.  It is the one 
being looked at who is objectified and turned into the Other, while the look 
is the mediator of that objectification.  I cannot see the look, but I can feel its 
force.  Like Fanon, I come to consider the spectator and the spectacle within 
myself as the double, integral, but particular conditions of my identity as the 
Other.  My experience engages these theories of the dominant gaze by providing 
me with images that remark on my position as an image of the Other, and as 
an internal viewer of this image.  Fanon recognised the racialised distribution 
of the impacts of the gaze in his analysis of the experience of being looked at as 
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a ‘black man’.  Fanon highlights the non-mutuality of looks in colonial settings, 
observing that only white subjects can adopt the power that is positioned in the 
gaze where black subjects must constantly offer themselves to be looked at in a 
process that makes them vulnerable to psychosomatic damage.  Although this 
is itself born of a misrecognition of Fanon himself by a white gaze, it is the one 
that is withdrawn from a black man under a colonial setting.
Fanon’s explanation of the white gaze is based on Lacan’s theory of the mir-
ror stage.  The black man’s subjectivity is constructed by the recognition of him-
self through images reflected in a mirror, through the Other — on the way in 
which others see him.  What I can recognise is not what I am, but the image of 
myself which is not simply formed by myself.  If I accept Lacan’s theory as the 
principle of the formation of the colonised subject as well as the disabled sub-
ject, it might be useful in explaining the mechanism of the internal process of 
inferiority of the colonised and disability.
My physical disability affects the way in which I experience modes of em-
bodiment, such as walking, speaking and sitting still.  For example, owing to 
my physical disability, I am not able to control my neck movements.  When I 
have a haircut, I always feel nervous because I know that I cannot stop my neck 
flinching, and it is very difficult for my hairdresser to cut my hair.  Although I 
like being dressed up and having a nice hairdo, I do not like sitting in a chair at 
the hairdressing salon.  Moreover, I have to look at my own image in a mirror, 
casting my neck under a spell of immobility.  I often imagine what I should do 
at the hairdresser’s, and I am also very aware of my head moving involuntarily. 
Since I am not able to position my neck as expected in any of these ways, the 
nature of my experience of having a haircut is shaped differently from others. 
While others seem to enjoy their time at the salon, it is difficult for me to in-
habit the same world that they do.  Despite the fact that I was primarily uneasy 
about my inability to control my neck movement, I now accept it as a part of 
myself.  My neck movement has naturally adjusted over time to reflect the hair-
dresser’s skill.  Most hairdressers have difficulties in attuning to my odd posture 
and involuntary movements, and some of them refuse me as a customer.  It is 
very difficult for me to find a good hairdresser.  While sitting in the chair and 
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seeing myself and my hairdresser in the mirror, I feel uneasy and sorry for the 
hairdresser who is giving me a haircut — then my body starts shivering.  For me 
the look in the mirror always objectifies.  I, as the looker, am active, aggressive, 
and the looked-at - the victim of the gaze.  I like my current hairdresser because 
she does not care about my neck movement; she never makes me talk whilst 
giving me a haircut.  She is aware of my embodied condition that if I speak, my 
neck will move a lot.  To me, the hairdresser’s salon has become the place where 
I have experienced my own vulnerability in much the same way as others may 
experience their vulnerabilities at a hospital where they cannot take control of 
their own bodies.  In effect, the look prevented me from looking back into the 
eyes of the small girl who looked at me.  Even though she is not present in the 
salon, I feel the same force by looking in the mirror which shows the gaze of my 
hairdresser and others in the salon.
My lived experience informs my awareness of the world around me.  My 
awareness can only be understood by taking my body into account.  The phe-
nomenology of my disability has shown how my body is experienced in the 
able-bodied world and how taken for granted routines are disrupted invoking 
my own ways, revealing how embodiment and my subjective orientation reflex-
ively interrelate with cultural imagery and discourse to transfigure myself.  Fur-
ther, the phenomenological study of my own experience has suggested that my 
emotion is best analysed as interpreted processes embedded within experiential 
contexts.  The world and I are seen as tangled together: I actively engage in and 
with the world, and I am aware of myself and the world through my own em-
bodied experience in it.  Phenomenology places emphasis on subjective descrip-
tions rather than on objective assumption or fundamental justifications.
My disabled body is constantly in a state of attunement, waiting for the day 
it will be fixed. I always feel that there is something wrong with my body.  As I 
showed in the example of sitting in a chair at the hairdresser’s salon, I always try 
to mimic the able-bodied female body.  However, I am doomed to fail to adapt 
qualities of normative posture and behaviour.  Internalisation of the able-bodied 
gaze involves apprehending that which belongs to the Other and incorporating 
it as my own.  Thus, the processes of internalisation are not simple and predict-
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able.  The absorption process is deeper, implying a belief that the disabled body 
requires something that only able-bodied people have or can give them.
Phenomenological questions about my own experience of disability are of-
ten framed as what-is-it like questions: “What is it like to” have a particular form 
of cerebral palsy, to sit a chair at the hairdresser’s salon, and to give a talk.  Such 
questions are sometimes requests for factual information about how I manage 
tasks with my disability - “how do I give a lecture, if my voice is too weak to be 
heard?”  In other cases, they are requests for self-report about my lived experi-
ence of being in a particular condition — “what does it feel like to use text-to-
speech software to teach?”  When I write about “what it was like” to have my 
embodiment, the descriptions may vary considerably.  The most obvious reason 
is that there are many variations in the physical and functional conditions of 
which I am capable.  I have very different embodied experiences, not only differ-
ent from most able-bodied people who can control their head movements and 
speak with ease, but also different from any disabled person who cannot walk, 
cannot see, cannot hear, or who cannot speak at all.
Trouble with communicating is a big issue for me. I have to move my facial 
muscles into the right position to speak.  I understand what normative pronun-
ciations in both English and Japanese languages should sound like; I also know 
that I do not pronounce them correctly.  It is impossible for me to pronounce 
these words as speech language pathologists have advised me to do. I have many 
problems moving my mouth to form words correctly.  When I hear background 
noises, I cannot focus on listening to what people are saying and therefore I can-
not speak to them with ease.  It is not helpful to fix the movements of my mouth 
and tongue as some have suggested in order to improve my speech, because I 
have already developed my own way of communicating and my facial muscles 
have adapted to certain ways according to my embodied subjectivity.  For ex-
ample, when speech language pathologists asked me to say words, to close my 
mouth, or to stick out my tongue, I found it very difficult because my whole 
body froze when I felt nervous.  It may be helpful to make a social setting where 
I feel relaxed and comfortable to speak.  However, in reality, society does not 
work for me.  Computer technology, in particular the Internet, helps me a lot. 
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To help me communicate more effectively, it is not so important to fix or articu-
late my speech in a normative way, but it is vital to seek help for my needs.6)
Though able to speak, I have felt uneasy speaking in public spaces, such 
as in busy London, assuming that people will be shocked or panicked because 
they cannot understand what I am saying. It is easier to remain mute.  I also 
have to consider what would happen if my speech was unintelligible: my body 
would freeze up.  When I have tried to get attention, most people just ignored 
me before, eventually, someone has stopped to assist.  I wondered if this was 
because, in the UK, I look East Asian and so could have been be mistaken for 
a tourist.  I also wondered if it would have been easier if I had been recognised 
as a disabled person, because then people might have treated me better and not 
have been shocked.  My bodily disruptions appear first in the lips, tongue, and 
jaw, and quickly spread to other parts of my face, head and neck.  Pain from 
contractions of my neck muscles, over which I have no control, adds to the ir-
regular and jerky movements which block speech further.  Tremors are the first 
to appear, and then my body freezes up.  It often begins when I think my speech 
is not intelligible and acceptable to others, or when I try to regain control of my 
speech and to make it flow.
These arise as reactions to the fear of not-being-understood.  My fears are 
heightened by the possibility of a negative response from any stranger and I try 
to avoid unintelligibility, often substituting words that are easier to pronounce 
for the  ones I fear are too difficult to say.  Sometimes, I avoid talking altogether. 
I attempt to cover up my condition; for instance a hand over the mouth while 
talking or writing notes.  For me, cerebral palsy disrupts communication, not 
only because of its effects on my speech production and the limits this imposes 
on my use of language use and, indeed, thought, but also because my cerebral 
palsy cannot be separated from the experience of my own body and people’s 
reactions to my embodied self.
Concluding Remarks:
This essay seeks to illustrate the problematic approaches towards the in-
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tersection of disability, femininity, and blackness that underpins a great deal of 
thought.  It has stresses that disability, like femininity for Beauvoir and blackness 
for Fanon, should be considered as the Other.  Each experience of otherness 
may share some similarities, but they are also quite distinct.  The essay high-
lights the complex connections between disability, femininity, and blackness in 
phenomenological dialogues of lived experiences.  In my view, phenomenology 
of disability offers the opportunity to transcend the able-bodied gaze which sees 
the disabled body as a passive object and as the Other.  The internalisation of the 
able-bodied gaze or norm helps explain my own oppression.  I do not choose to 
think about my body and embodiment negatively; rather I am forced to do so as 
a result of being embedded in an able-bodied society.
The impact of the gaze is that it allows the dominant (the able-bodied, the 
white, the male) to control the social spaces and social interactions of all other 
bodies.  The Other is made visible and invisible at the same time under the gaze. 
For example, when I am looked at, it is often with a specific gaze that sees the 
‘weird’, the ‘vulnerable’ or the ‘abnormal’.  Thus, I am seen and constrained by the 
able-bodied gaze that is intended to control my physical and social movements. 
The purpose of the gaze is that it should restrain those who receive it and make 
them wish to be invisible.  In the latter part of this essay, I have opened up a 
space for myself to recuperate, as an embodied subject, my experiences previ-
ously blocked from the normative world.  This simultaneously provides me with 
an opportunity to work out a strategy of dealing with the mirror as indicated by 
my own recovery from my disturbing past with the help of other people in the 
community.
[Notes]
1) This essay is based on a talk presented at both the 40th seminar of Exciting Leading-
Edge Research Projects: the Future of the Human Beings in the Age of Biosciences 
( “Phenomenology of Embodiment and Patient-based Research (Tojisha-Kenkyu)) 
which was held on 13th July 2013 in the Graduate School of Human Sciences at 
Osaka University and the 23rd World Philosophy Congress which was held from 
4th August through 10th August 2013 at the University of Athens, Greece.  I would 
like to thank the audience of both sessions, in particular, Professor Tetsuya Kono, 
The Disabled Body, the Able-bodied Form 15
Associate Professor Lisa Folkmarson käll, Dr Hitomi Saito, Dr Irina Poleshchuk, and 
Associate professor Yasuhiko Murakami for their helpful comments and intellectual 
support.  I am highly indebted to Mr. John Nicholls, Dr Shane Hopkinson, and 
Dr Michael Gillan Peckitt for their constant discussions as well as for providing 
necessary information.  This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 
25370010.
2) I was born prematurely (six weeks early).  I heard that a doctor who was present 
decided to put me into an incubator.  Unfortunately, the decision was wrong for me 
because the incubator did not provide enough oxygen; I was anoxic.  No one knew 
what was wrong with me at that time.  My parents came to realise that there might 
be something wrong with me when I was six to eight months old, because my head 
was never steady; I always held it to one side.  I was not good at suckling and then 
I would vomit up all the milk I drank.  My mother took me to the hospital and 
finally, when I was about ten months old, I was diagnosed as being afflicted with 
cerebral palsy. 
3) Metamorphosis is the story of a young man, Gregor Samsa, who transformed 
overnight into a giant beetle-like insect, becomes an object of disgust to his fam-
ily, an outsider in his own home, and an alienated man.  It describes feelings of 
helplessness, guilt, and isolation. 
4) Frantz Fanon was a psychiatrist, born in the French colony of Martinique, who 
dedicated much of his life to the liberation of Algeria from France. Among other 
achievements, he wrote the influential books such as Black Skin, White Masks (2008 
[1952]) and The Wretched of the Earth (1990 [1961]). These texts exerted a great 
influence on what would later become the field of post-colonial theory and criti-
cism.
5) Double consciousness is a concept that Du Bois first explores in 1903. Double con-
sciousness describes the individual sensation of feeling as though one’ s identity is 
divided into several parts, making it impossible to have one unified identity. He 
spoke of this within the context of racism in the United State, and maintained that 
since black Americans have lived in a society that has historically repressed and 
devalued them that it has become difficult for them to unify their own identity 
with their American identity.  Double consciousness forces blacks to not only few 
themselves from their own unique perspective, but to also view themselves as they 
might be perceived by the outside world. This is what Fanon develops his concept 
of the gaze from Du Bois - “the sense of looking at one’ s self through the eyes of 
others”.
6) e.g. providing alternative technological devices, a quiet space, and other methodol-
ogies of making me feel relaxed.
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SUMMARY
The Disabled Body, the Able-bodied Form:
A Feminist Exploration of Dialogue between Beauvoir and Fanon
Minae Inahara
This paper offers an account of my entry into the able-bodied world where the 
gravity of the ‘able-bodied gaze’ has disrupted me and made me feel vulnera-
ble.  In Black Skins, White Masks, Frantz Fanon develops his epidermal racial 
schemes as restoratives to Merleau-Ponty’s overly inclusive body schema.  Aware 
of the reality of his own embodied subjectivity, Fanon uses his schema to de-
scribe the establishment and maintenance of white-formed ‘blackness’. Through 
a re-telling of his own experiences of racism, Fanon is able to show how a black 
person in a racialised framework eventually internalises the ‘white gaze’.  In this 
paper, I shall bring Fanon’s understandings into di alogue with Simone de Beau-
voir’s discussion of femininity.  Although the internalisation of the normative 
narrative creates a situation in which external constraints are no longer needed, I 
shall underline both the socio-cultural contingency of ‘disability’ and the ways in 
which the oppressed may reconstruct their subjectivities.  Lastly, I shall explore 
my own experiences, once again engaging with Fanon and Beauvoir as partners 
for dialogue within phenomenological philosophy.

